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Abstract
“The universe is expanding, not contracting.” Many statements of this form
appear unambiguously true; after all, the discovery of the universe’s expan-
sion is one of the great triumphs of empirical science. However, the state-
ment is time-directed: the universe expands towardswhat we call the future;
it contracts towards the past. If we deny that time has a direction, should we
also deny that the universe is really expanding? This article draws together
and discusses what I call ‘C-theories’ of time — in short, philosophical posi-
tions that hold time lacks a direction — from different areas of the literature.
I set out the various motivations, aims, and problems for C-theories, and
outline different versions of antirealism about the direction of time.
1 What is a C-theory of time?
Does time have a direction? In order to answer this question, we can first ask:
what would it be for time to have a direction? And to reflect on this, it is helpful to
ask: what would it be for time to be adirectional — to lack a direction? Though the
directionality of time is largely assumed in ordinary language and across scientific
explanations of phenomena, the philosophical literature on the adirectionality of
time is quite sparse. The present article draws together and surveys a number of
related debates about the adirectionality of time from different areas of philosophy.
For reasons we shall come to, I categorise temporally adirectional positions as ‘C-
theories’ of time. The article introduces the notation and advocates a preferred
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way to characterise the debate between C-theories and rival directional theories
of time (Section 1), discusses three different motivations for C-theories stemming
from debates in the foundations of physics and philosophy of science (Section 2),
and offers two alternative ways to understand C-theorists’ antirealism about the
direction of time (Section 3).
1.1 Dynamic, static, and adirectional time
The dominant issue in the philosophy of time has been whether time really passes.
This is straightforward to outline: the term ‘the present moment’ continuously
refers to later and later times; does this correspond to a feature of reality inde-
pendent of us, or is it merely some kind of artefact of our perspective in time?
Dynamic views take time to be in some sense animated, flowing, or anyway pos-
sessing some quintessential quality that contrasts with our more static concep-
tion of space. Conversely, so-called static¹ views take time to be far more like
space; something that is extended, in which events are laid out across time much
like how objects are laid out across space. This debate can be traced back to the
Presocratics, with followers of Parmenides of Elea taking reality to be a fixed, un-
changing whole, and followers of Heraclitus of Ephesus taking change (or ‘flux’)
to be the essence of reality. In the twentieth century, this debate continued un-
der the rubric of the pro-passage ‘A-theory of time’ and anti-passage ‘B-theory of
time’, with this terminology stemming from J. M. E. McTaggart’s (1908) influen-
tial paper ‘The Unreality of Time’.² McTaggart termed the ‘A series’ the series of
events ‘running from past to future’ and the ‘B series’ the series of events ‘run-
ning from earlier to later’, with the key distinction being that only the former
is dynamic: events in the A series change from being ‘future’, to being ‘present’
¹As Price (1996, p. 13) notes, this usage of ‘static’ is problematic since it implies a time framewith
respect to which the relevant object does not change, which in the case of time would require an
additional temporal dimensionwith respect towhich time itself were unchanging. Moreover, ‘static’
theorists of time ordinarily take the characteristically dynamic aspects of temporal experience to
be entailed by their theories — cf. Williams (1951); Prosser (2013, 2016); Deng (2013); Farr (2020).
²Though the A- and B-theories are based onMcTaggart’s A and B series, the contemporary usage
and understanding of ‘A-theory’ and ‘B-theory’ come from Richard M. Gale. Gale (1966), refers to
the “A theory Answer” and “B theory Answer” to McTaggart’s paradox, and later Gale (1968) uses
‘B-theory’ refers to the view that A series terms such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are reducible
to B series terms of ‘earlier-than-x’, ‘simultaneous-with-x’ and ‘later-than-x’ respectively, where
‘x’ picks out one’s temporal location.
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and then finally ‘past’; whereas on the B series, one event’s being ‘earlier than’ an-
other doesn’t change in any equivalent way. Following McTaggart: (a) A-theorists
hold a loosely connected set of views according to which present things are meta-
physically special compared to future and past things, and time passes; and (b)
B-theorists hold that past, present and future events are metaphysically on a par,
and there is no objective sense in which time passes.
However, the issue of dynamic versus static doesn’t exhaust the debate. Even
if we reject temporal passage and embrace the static view, this leaves open
whether time is directed in a way that space is not. This question has appeared in
a number of debates in science and philosophy, most notably in the foundations
of statistical mechanics in the work of the Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann,
who entertained the idea that for the universe as a whole ‘the two directions of
time are indistinguishable, just as in space there is no up and down’ (Boltzmann,
1964, pp. 446). Building on Boltzmann’s speculation, calling it ‘one of the keenest
insights into the problem of time’, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach (1956)
set out a reductionist account of the direction of time in terms of the statistical
behaviour of thermal systems according to which time as a whole ‘has no direc-
tion’³ (p. 129). More recent debates have concerned whether time is ultimately
symmetrical in nature, whether the apparent direction of time is fundamental
or emergent, whether instantaneous states of systems are time-directed, and
whether quantum states depend upon both past and future measurements. Given
this variety of issues concerning directionality, it is helpful to move beyond the
canonical dichotomy between A- and B-theories of time, and frame the issue
between McTaggart’s B series and his lesser-known C series.
1.2 The C series
Reichenbach contended that classical mechanics gives a picture of time as ‘or-
dered’ but not ‘directed’. Such a view fits with McTaggart’s C series, which he
introduced as a temporally adirectional counterpart to his B series:
[T]he C series, while it determines the order, does not determine the
³Reichenbach stresses that a direction of time can only be defined locally for ‘certain sections
of time’. He uses the terminology of ‘supertime’ to refer to a background time parameter which
orders such sections. Supertime, he notes, ‘has no direction but only an order’ (p. 129).
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direction. If the C series runs M, N, O, P, then the B series from earlier
to later […] can run either M, N, O, P (so that M is earliest and P
latest) or else P, O, N, M (so that P is earliest and M latest). And
there is nothing […] in the C series […] to determine which it will be.
(McTaggart, 1908, p. 462; my emphasis.)
We can understand a B series as a time ordering in terms of which events are
earlier than other events, and a C series as a time ordering in terms of which
events are temporally between which other events. If we think of the two world
wars and the presumably incoming third one, their B series states that World War
I is earlier than World War II and each is earlier than World War III, and their
C series states that World War II is temporally between World War I and World
War III. Whereas a B-theory takes things in time to form a directed ordering by
means of the ‘earlier than’ relation, a C-theory of time takes things in time to form
an undirected ordering, for instance being ordered by means of a symmetrical
‘temporal betweenness’ relation.⁴ Farr (2012a,b, 2018, MS) defends a C-theory of
time, and such a position is presented and discussed as an alternative to A- and B-
theories by Le Bihan (2015, sec. 4), Callender (2017, ch. 13, sec. 3), Maudlin (2018,
p. 1809), Baron and Miller (2018, pp. 115–6), Kajimoto et al. (2019).⁵ Prominent
defences of adirectional theories of time fitting this characterisation of C-theory,
though without using such labels, include Reichenbach (1956), Gold (1966) and
Price (1996).⁶
In general, C-theories take time to be adirectional in some important sense
that contrasts with the directionality of the B series. In this way, we can under-
stand the three different theories — A to C — in terms of the structure they attach
⁴Though McTaggart implies in the above-quoted passage that the central notion of the C series
is that of the preservation of a temporal betweenness structure, he elsewhere suggests the C series
requires an ‘asymmetric and transitive’ binary relation (McTaggart, 1927, p. 258) to mimic the B
series’ binary ‘earlier-than’ relation.
⁵Of these, none explicitly defend the C-theory at the expense of the B-theory, Callender is critical
of taxonomising philosophical problems of time in terms of McTaggart’s three series, and Maudlin
takes himself to defend the B-theory.
⁶McTaggart himself took only the C series to be real, but was not a C-theorist of time since he
held the C series to be insufficient for the reality of time, with the (non-existent) A series to be
necessary for time. McTaggart took the real, mind-independent C series of objects to be ‘misper-
ceived’ by subjects as A and B series (see, for instance, McTaggart, 1927, p. 214), in line with his
wider idealistic philosophy.
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Dynamic Directed Ordered
A-theory 3 3 3
B-theory 7 3 3
C-theory 7 7 3
Table 1: A-theories, B-theories and C-theories understood in terms of a descending hierarchy of
structure attributed to time.
to time, as depicted in Table 1: A-theories take time to be ordered,⁷ directed, and
dynamic; B-theories take time to be ordered and directed but not dynamic;⁸ C-
theories take time to be ordered but neither directed nor dynamic. As such, the
B- and C-theories are both ‘static’ views, but disagree over the independent issue
of whether time is directed. From now on I will refer to A- and B-theories as
‘directional theories’ of time, as opposed to the adirectionality of C-theories.
1.3 The Reichenbach–Gold equivalence thesis
On A- and B-theories of time, since time is directed (i.e. from past to future), then
time in principle could have had the opposite direction; for example, if we take
our universe to ‘really’ expand and not contract over time, then the time-reverse
of our world (one that ‘really’ contracts) is non-identical to our world. This min-
imal conception of time direction can be rejected by C-theorists, holding instead
that time is adirectional insofar as there is no clear sense in which the world could
be reversed in time. Indeed, this idea is central to the ‘Reichenbach–Gold’ equiv-
alence thesis, independently defended by both Reichenbach and Thomas Gold,
which holds that if we describe our world as though it were running backwards
in time, we are not describing a different possible world, but rather providing an
equivalent description of the very same world (cf. Reichenbach (1956, ch. 5), Gold
(1966), Earman (1974, sec. 4–6), Price (2011, sec. 3.3–3.8), Farr (2018, sec. 2.1–2.2)).
⁷I use ‘ordered’ to refer to McTaggart’s notion of a temporal betweenness ordering.
⁸This is a little incongruent with many presentations of B-theories in the literature. Since the B-
theory is ordinarily presented as a static alternative to the A-theory, it is nonstandard to present the
B-theory as explicitly committed to a direction of time. My presentation makes use of the positive
feature of McTaggart’s B series, as a time-directed converse to the C series.
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Central to any discussion of the direction of time is the pervasiveness of ir-
reversible processes — processes for which the time-reverse process does not (or
rarely does) occur — such as the mixing of different colours of paint, the smash-
ing of glass, etc. However, classical mechanics is traditionally understood to allow
only reversible processes; e.g. if you were to reverse the velocity of each molecule
in a gas that had been left to spread out for some time, the gas would evolve
back to its original state. In the context of a discussion of the time reversibility of
classical mechanical processes, Reichenbach (1956, pp. 31–32) holds that ‘positive
and negative time supply equivalent descriptions, and it would be meaningless to
ask which of the two descriptions is true,’ since one can describe any allowable
process relative to either temporal direction and so it is superfluous to hold that
classical mechanics describes or governs processes only in the past-to-future di-
rection. Reichenbach’s equivalence thesis is shared by Gold (1966, p. 327), who
notes ‘the description of our universe in the opposite sense of time […] is not
describing another universe, or how [our universe] might be but isn’t, but it is de-
scribing the very same thing’, adding that such a description may indeed ‘sound
very strange’, but this oddness is due to the unfamiliarity of the future-to-past
perspective rather than due to getting something about the world wrong. This
way of thinking about C-theories fits particularly well with McTaggart’s (1908)
presentation of the C series, since what remains invariant when switching from
past-to-future to future-to-past descriptions is the temporal betweenness relations
holding between the events described.
2 Three motivations for C-theories
There have been a number of different avenues for articulating and defending
adirectional accounts of time. This section locates three key motivations for C-
theories arising in debates within the philosophy of science and foundations of
physics.
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2.1 Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics
In trying to provide a microphysical account for the famous time asymmetry of
thermodynamics (why gasses spread out over time and do not contract; why tem-
perature differences between interacting substances decrease over time and don’t
increase, etc.; for excellent overviews see Uffink (2001) and Callender (2016)) Boltz-
mann ran into Loschmidt’s reversibility objection: given that classical mechani-
cal processes are time reversible, it follows that if entropy-increasing behaviour
(towards our future) is possible then so is entropy-decreasing behaviour. Reflect-
ing on this problem, Boltzmann entertained the possibility that the universe as a
whole may have no global monotonic⁹ entropy gradient, but rather there are suffi-
ciently large fluctuations from maximal entropy to produce observable universes
like ours. In such a case, Boltzmann speculates:
[T]he two directions of time are indistinguishable, just as in space
there is no up and down […. J]ust as at a particular place on the earth’s
surface we call “down” the direction toward the center of the earth, so
will a living being in a particular time interval of such a single world
distinguish the direction of time toward the less probable state from
the opposite direction (the former toward the past, the latter toward
the future). (Boltzmann, 1964, pp. 446–447)
Boltzmann’s idea is evocative yet ambiguous, implying that directionality is: a
local but not global feature of time; an emergent and not fundamental feature of
time; and something that is useful for humans to ascribe to time, but not necessar-
ily reflective of an objective or underlying feature of time. Reichenbach’s seminal
work The Direction of Time develops Boltzmann’s ideas, defining the direction
of time in terms of the direction of increasing entropy of systems, with the con-
sequence that entropy itself is not directed with respected to some background
temporal arrow: ‘it has no meaning to say […] that […] entropy “really” goes up,
or that its time direction is “really” positive’ (Reichenbach, 1956, pp. 128–9).
⁹I use ‘monotonic’ here to refer to the familiar idea of ‘one-wayness’ of entropy gradients. In
C-theoretic terms, entropy does not strictly ‘increase and not decrease’; instead we can use ‘mono-
tonic’ to mean ‘if x increases anywhere in some direction y, x does not decrease anywhere in direc-
tion y. See Farr (2018, sec. 2.2.2) for details.
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Much contemporary work in the philosophy of statistical mechanics, build-
ing on Boltzmann’s approach, has taken the time asymmetry of thermodynamics
to be due not to an underlying time directionality in the microdynamics of sys-
tems, but to a fact about one temporal end of the universe, namely that it is in
a state of macroscopically very low entropy, which Albert (2000) terms the ‘past
hypothesis’.¹⁰ Discussions of the past hypothesis have focussed on (a) whether
the assumption of the low-entropy past entails the familiar ‘modal’ time asym-
metries of cause and effect and the ability to control future and not past states
of affairs,¹¹ and (b) whether the hypothesised low-entropy state stands in need of
further explanation or justification.¹²
What is of most interest regarding the C-theory is whether the past-
hypothesis-based explanation of the second law is C-theoretic in nature. On this
issue Price (2002, 2004, 2006) helpfully distinguishes between ‘one-asymmetry’
and ‘two-asymmetry’ models: a one-asymmetry model aims to account for the
thermodynamic time asymmetry solely in terms of the past hypothesis, without
recourse to any further time asymmetric mechanisms, whereas a two-asymmetry
model makes the further assumption of a time-asymmetric ‘dynamical cause or
factor, responsible for entropy increase’ (Price, 2006, p. 214). The central question
is whether one requires more than an assumption of low entropy at one temporal
end of the universe to explain the various time asymmetries we associate with
the second law of thermodynamics. There are two different general proposals
for a second asymmetry: (1) some additional time-asymmetric physical law or
¹⁰The terminology of ‘past hypothesis’ derives from Feynman’s remark that ‘it is necessary to
add to the physical laws the hypothesis that in the past the universe was more ordered […] than
it is today — I think this is the additional statement that is needed to make sense, and to make an
understanding of the irreversibility’ (Feynman et al., 1971, p. 116). Albert (2000, p. 96) takes the past
hypothesis to be the hypothesis that the early universe was in “whatever particular low-entropy
highly condensed big-bang sort of macrocondition it is that the normal inferential procedures of cos-
mology will eventually present to us,” implying that such a hypothesis unifies statistical mechanics
with cosmology, something Callender (2004a) takes to be a theoretical virtue of the past hypothesis.
¹¹See Albert (2000), Kutach (2002, 2013) and Loewer (2007, 2012) for arguments to this effect, and
Frisch (2005, 2010, 2014) and Price and Weslake (2010) for criticism.
¹²Price (2002, 2004) argues that past hypothesis does stand in need of further explanation, and
Callender (2004a,b) argues that it does not, instead taking the past hypothesis amount to a non-
dynamical law of nature. See Baras and Shenker (2020) for a recent assessment of the dialectic
between Price and Callender.
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mechanism that plays a role in entropy increase;¹³ and (2) some deeper direction-
ality of time that offers a metaphysical explanation for the thermodynamic time
asymmetry. The second of these strategies requires an explicit rejection of the
C-theory.
Maudlin (2007) makes a case for (2), that an underlying directionality of time
itself does explanatory work regarding the past hypothesis, fitting with his de-
fence of ‘a B series theory over a C series theory’ (Maudlin, 2007, p. 126; fn. 11).
Though the state posited by the past hypothesis is macroscopically atypical in
that it is very low entropy, later states of such a universe are also microscopically
atypical in that the molecular positions and momenta are such that, if evolved
backwards in time, they’d lead to ever lower-entropy macrostates. Maudlin ar-
gues that his own B-theoretic metaphysics explains such microscopic atypicality
away by holding systems to “really” evolve forwards and not backwards in time:
microscopic atypicality is ‘completely accounted for by how it was generated or
produced […via] evolution from [the] initial state’ (p. 133), something not avail-
able to the C-theorist, since ‘[t]his sort of explanation requires that there be a fact
about which states produce which[, which] is provided by a direction of time’ (p.
134; emphases added). See Loewer (2012) and Farr (2018) for responses toMaudlin,
and Loew (2018) for a defence.
2.2 Time reversal symmetry
The time reversibility of classical mechanics is, independently of its relevance to
the thermodynamic arrow, widely deemed relevant to whether time is directed.
Time reversal can be understood in classical terms as a set of operations that
reverse a physical motion; the time reverse of a ball rolling from left to right is
a ball of equal mass rolling with the same speed but from right to left. A theory
is invariant under time reversal if and only if the time reverse of every motion
allowed by the theory is also a motion allowed by the theory, meaning that a time
¹³Albert (1994a,b, 2000) suggests that a statistical mechanics based on the GRW formulation of
quantum mechanics would offer a potentially fruitful version of (1) (though does not explicitly en-
dorse such a position). See Price (2002) for an argument that Albert’s suggested second asymmetry
would be ‘redundant’ in the explanation of the second law, and North (2002) for a response to Price
and defence of Albert’s GRW suggestion.
C-Theories of Time | Matt Farr | October 10, 2020 10
reversal invariant theory can model any allowable process relative to either time
direction (‘forwards’ or ‘backwards’ in time).¹⁴
A number of authors (e.g. Reichenbach (1956), Mehlberg (1962), Gold (1966),
Horwich (1987), Price (1996, 1997)) have held that the widespread time reversal in-
variance of the fundamental physical theories is evidence that time is adirectional
(C-theoretic).¹⁵ Mehlberg (1962, p. 104) offers a ‘no miracles’ argument for the C-
theory, saying ‘it would be either a miracle or an unbelievable coincidence if all
the major scientific theories […] somehowmanaged to co-operate with each other
so as to conceal time’s arrow from us,’ suggesting instead that it ‘would be neither
a miracle nor an unbelievable coincidence […] if there were nothing to conceal —
that is, if time had no arrow’. Horwich (1987) makes the related claim that time
reversal invariance of theories provides empirical grounds for holding time to be
‘isotropic’ — i.e. structurally the same in both directions — insofar as ‘there have
emerged no compelling reasons to adopt [fundamental] time-asymmetric laws’ (p.
54).¹⁶ And Price (1989, 1995, 1996, 1997) takes the prevalent time symmetry of mi-
crophysics to fail to support the kinds of time-asymmetric reasoning commonly
appealed to in physics, such as that correlated motions of particles can only be
explained by past interactions and not by future interactions. He argues that this
has prevented physicists from properly recognising the explanatory problems of
time asymmetries in physics (such as thermodynamic arrow), and from taking
seriously retrocausal interpretations of quantum mechanics.¹⁷
There are two separate lines of response to the claim that time reversal invari-
ance supports C-theories. The first is an empirical issue, namely that the violation
of CP symmetry (the combined symmetry of systems with respect to inversion of
¹⁴For useful introductions to time reversal and time symmetry, see North (2008) and Roberts
(2019).
¹⁵Accordingly, many have appealed to the same link to argue that time reversal non-invariant
laws would imply that time has a direction (i.e. is B-theoretic) — for instance, Arntzenius (1995,
2004), Malament (2004), North (2008) and Arntzenius and Greaves (2009) argue that time reversal
non-invariant laws require the postulation of a temporal orientation (a geometrical representation
of the direction of time) in order to be stated in coordinate-free terms.
¹⁶Though isotropy is not equivalent to adirectionality (since the two directions could be struc-
turally distinct, and so anisotripic, without time being directed), Horwich appears to hold that
isotropy entails adirectionality.
¹⁷On quantum mechanics, see also Price (1994) and Price and Wharton (2015)).
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charge and spatial handedness) in weak interactions¹⁸ is evidence that the laws of
physics are not time reversal invariant. Horwich and Price have defended their
C-theoretic positions in light of CP symmetry violation: Horwich (1987, p. 56)
questions the robustness of experimental methods and assumptions behind CP vi-
olations (though see Maudlin (2007, pp. 117–118) for a convincing response, and
Gołosz (2017) for a discussion); and Price (1996, p. 116) notes that the divergence
from symmetry is ‘tiny’ and that ‘the puzzling character of the existence of this
tiny exception serves to highlight the intuitive appeal of the prevailing rule [of
time reversal invariance]’.
A second response is to reject the link between time reversal and C-theories,
holding instead that C-theories should neither stand nor fall with whether the
laws of physics actually are time reversal invariant. This response stems from the
difference between time being symmetrical or isotropic in nature, and being adi-
rectional. Firstly, it does not follow from time being structurally asymmetric or
anisotropic that it is also directed — such a feature would pick out a difference be-
tween the two directions, but would not alone suffice to pick out one direction as
privileged, more basic, special, etc. As such, one can hold that time is structurally
asymmetric, but adirectional. Farr (2018) argues that the central claim of the C-
theory — that forwards-in-time and backwards-in-time descriptions of processes
are equivalent (the Reichenbach–Gold thesis) — holds regardless of whether the
relevant laws are time reversal invariant.¹⁹ Moreover, one could simply reject, as
Maudlin (2007, pp. 118–120) does, that the time-reversal invariance of fundamen-
tal laws would even entail that time is symmetrical or isotropic.
2.3 Temporally bidirectional laws
A third relevant issue is whether the laws of nature are temporally unidirectional
or bidirectional. Bertrand Russell (1913, p. 15) appealed to the two-way, or ‘bidirec-
tional’, nature of dynamical laws with respect to time to critique the classical idea
¹⁸Specifically in the comparative decay rates of neutral K-mesons and B-mesons and their an-
tiparticles. For details, see Sachs (1987), Bigi and Sanda (2009), Roberts (2014).
¹⁹Earman (1974, p. 27) raises such a point as a criticism of a related C-theoretic position of Max
Black (1962), noting that the view that time reversal amounts to a redescription of a single state of
affairs ‘follows whether or not the laws of physics are time reversal invariant’; see Farr (2018, sec.
2.2) for a discussion.
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that later states of the world are ‘produced’, ‘compelled’ or ‘determined’ by earlier
states of the world and not vice versa. Appealing to functional laws in physics,
Russell notes ‘[t]he law [of gravitation] makes no difference between past and
future: the future “determines” the past in exactly the same sense in which the
past “determines” the future’. The idea is that in classical physics, past and future
states of the world are equally related to the present state by means of the rel-
evant dynamical laws, and hence physical laws don’t lend independent support
to a picture of time as directed from past to future. Russell’s use of scare quotes
around ‘determines’ indicates that the bidirectionality he speaks of concerns the
fact that dynamical equations can be used to calculate both future and past tra-
jectories of physical systems, and does not refer to a deeper metaphysical idea of
the past and future being determined by the present state of affairs. Nonetheless,
some (e.g. Norton, 2007, 2009 and Farr and Reutlinger, 2013) hold that Russell’s
point motivates an eliminativist attitude towards the direction of cause and effect
in fundamental physics, supporting the idea that there is no underlying sense in
which later things are caused or produced only by earlier things.²⁰
It’s important to distinguish bidirectionality from the related notion of time
reversal invariance. We could imagine a time-reversal non-invariant law L that
dictates that the value of some quantity doubles in magnitude each second to-
wards the future, and halves each second towards the past. L would then allow
us to predict the future and past of the systems it describes and so would be both
time-reversal non-invariant and bidirectional in this sense. The key point is that
it does not follow from the time-reversal non-invariance of a law that it is uni-
directional. Even though it is not thought of as a fundamental or exceptionless
law, the second law of thermodynamics is a case in point: just as entropy invari-
ably increases towards the future, it also decreases towards the past. To hold that
the second law describes a time-directed phenomenon of entropy-increase, rather
than the undirected but time-asymmetric entropy gradient, is to make an indepen-
dent assumption that the law is temporally unidirectional (we return to this point
in section 3.2).²¹ Conversely, it does not follow from a law being time-reversal
²⁰For discussions of variations of Russell’s ‘directionality argument’, see Field (2003), Ney (2009),
Frisch (2009, 2012, 2014), Price andWeslake (2010), Farr and Reutlinger (2013), and Blanchard (2016).
²¹This point is stressed by Reichenbach and Price: Reichenbach (1956, pp. 128–9) notes ‘it has no
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invariant that it is bidirectional. For instance Maudlin (2007, chs. 1&4) argues
that one should view even time-reversal invariant laws as being unidirectional
in nature, governing processes only towards the future, and supporting a picture
of global states as being products of earlier and not later states, on the grounds
that a temporally unidirectional ‘production’ conception of laws has independent
theoretical virtues and is not inconsistent with time reversal invariant laws (see
Maudlin, 2007, pp. 118–120 for a defence of these points). As such, there is scope
for reading a law as unidirectional or bidirectional in time regardless of whether
it is time reversal invariant.
Russell’s discussion of bidirectionality concerns only deterministic laws, but
should indeterministic laws be understood as unidirectional in nature? Watanabe
(1965), Sober (1993), and Arntzenius (1995, 1997a,b) have argued in varying ways
that indeterministic laws imply a direction of time on the grounds that transi-
tional probabilities from state to state can only be invariant over time (and hence
‘law-like’) in at most one temporal direction (though see Price (1996, pp. 144–
146) for arguments to the contrary). An instructive place to look regarding the
compatibility of indeterminism and C-theories of time is the apparently indeter-
ministic and time-asymmetric process of quantum measurement.²² Following on
from the time-symmetric account of quantum measurement of Aharonov et al.
(1964), there has been a range of time-symmetric formulations and interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics that take the state of a quantum system to depend
nontrivially upon both past and future measurements,²³ and so taking quantum
mechanics to be temporally bidirectional in nature. Examples of these include
the two-state-vector formulation of Aharonov and others (cf. Aharonov and Vaid-
meaning to say […] that […] entropy “really” goes up, or that its time direction is “really” positive’;
Price (2002, p. 88) notes that ‘[s]ome people may feel that they can make sense of the possibility
that one labelling scheme or other is objectively correct, and hence that there is an objective fact in
nature about the slope of this entropy gradient — whether it is positive or negative. On this view,
there is a further fact to be explained, in addition to the existence of the gradient itself’.
²²See Penrose (1989, p. 359) for an argument that due to the time-asymmetry of measurement,
quantum mechanics is a time-asymmetric theory, and Callender (2000) for a response.
²³‘Time symmetric quantum mechanics’ is usually taken to refer to a wide range of formalisms,
formulations and interpretations of quantum mechanics according to which either quantum mea-
surement is not irreducibly irreversible, or the basic formalism is time reversal invariant, or states
of systems are described in terms of values of past and future measurements, or involve some kind
of retrocausal relationship between measurement outcomes and hidden variables.
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man, 2007 for an overview), and Cramer’s (1986) ‘transactional interpretation’ (cf.
Kastner (2013)), each of which takes the quantum state to be determined by the
combination of a forwards-evolving and backwards-evolving wavefunction.²⁴ A
central feature of such accounts is that the state of a particle is determined by the
results of measurements it is temporally between, and not only those that are in
its past, and so fitting with the structure of a C-theory of time.²⁵
2.4 So far…
These debates show a variety of motivations for C-theories. Specifically, they
motivate different features of C-theories:
Non-Absoluteness. There is no absolute, all-encompassing directionality of time
applicable to all kinds of macroscopic and microscopic systems and the
world as a whole. Rather, the kinds of processes in the world that lead us to
think of the world as directed from past and future, such as the thermody-
namic arrow, are not fundamental nor global in nature, but rather emergent,
statistical, and/or local in nature, as in the Boltzmannian picture presented
in sec. 2.1. On such a view, there can fail to be a direction of time in certain
microscopic systems, or it can in principle vary from place to place and fail
to be global.²⁶
Symmetry. The opposite directions of time share the same structural features,
such that the fundamental dynamical laws are time reversal invariant, im-
plying that the same basic laws of nature apply regardless of whether our
²⁴For related C-theoretic accounts of quantum mechanics, see Wharton’s (2007) Lagrangian ac-
count and Sutherland’s (2008) causally-symmetrical version of De Broglie–Bohm theory, and the
‘relational blockworld’ of Silberstein et al. (2008, 2018)
²⁵Closely related to these are ‘retrocausal’ interpretations of quantum mechanics in which the
choice of measurement settings for a quantum measurement can have causal influence towards
both the past and future (cf. Costa de Beauregard (1977); Price (1994); Price and Wharton (2015);
Friederich and Evans (2019)).
²⁶I’ve presented non-absolutness so far to motivate the view that because our judgements as to
which direction in time to call ‘the future’ can vary from place to place, this motivates the view
that there is no underlying fact as to which is really the direction of time. But non-absoluteness
could also be used to motivate a local realist view of time direction, where there is in such regions
an underlying directionality of time, but it is not necessarily global. This second kind of position is
criticised by Earman’s (1974, p. 22) Principle of Precedence.
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world is viewed from past to future or from future to past. We’ve seen that
the putative time reversal invariance of the actual dynamical laws of funda-
mental physics has been taken as evidence for Symmetry.
Bidirectionality. The laws of nature are either bidirectional in time, in that later
things no more depend upon earlier things than vice versa (in the case of
deterministic laws), or have a ‘temporal betweenness’ structure whereby
states of theworld depend upon states in both temporal directions, implying
that regardless of whether the basic laws are time reversal invariant, they
do not describe a world in which later things ‘come out of’ or are ‘produced
by’ only earlier things.
Each of these features correspond to the idea of time being adirectional in differ-
ent ways, and although one might think of a C-theory of time as endorsing each
claim, a C-theorist could in principle reject one or more. For instance, one might
be motivated by Non-Absoluteness in taking beliefs about time direction to stem
from statistical features of large systems, whilst remaining agnostic as to whether
the fundamental laws of physics are time symmetric or bidirectional.²⁷ This can
be for various reasons. In the case of Symmetry, it is an open question whether
the laws of physics are time-reversal invariant: (1) the very issue of justifying
the standard sets of time reversal operations for theories is contentious;²⁸ (2) it
is possible that a new fundamental physical theory could be either time reversal
invariant or not. In the case of Bidirectionality, a C-theorist who takes a defla-
tionary or antirealist view of laws²⁹ might hold that there is no fact of the matter
whether the relevant laws are unidirectional or bidirectional. As such, ‘C-theory’
refers to a range of related but distinct positions, with the common thread being
that time is conceived to be adirectional in at least one of these senses.
²⁷Farr (2018) defends a C-theory of time whilst being agnostic about Symmetry.
²⁸For instance, the issue of justifying the standard set of time reversal transformations for classi-
cal electomagnetism has been discussed at length by Albert (2000), Earman (2002), Malament (2004),
Arntzenius and Greaves (2009), North (2008).
²⁹See Carroll (2016, sec. 4–5).
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3 Antirealism about the direction of time
We’ve seen a range of motivations for adopting a C-theory of time. But what does
it actually mean for time to be adirectional, and how does this fit with the ubiq-
uitous tendency to represent the world in time-directed ways and our ordinary
beliefs about processes being oriented from past-to-future, such as the expansion
of the universe and your own slow waltz towards the grave? This section outlines
antirealist accounts of the direction of time available to the C-theorist.
3.1 Direction in time, or direction of time?
The key focus of this section is on the difference between something being asym-
metric in time and it being directed in time. Many discussions of time asymmetry
focus on the further distinction between ‘asymmetries in time’ and ‘asymmetries
of time’ (cf. Sklar (1977, ch. 5F), Horwich (1987), Price (1996, pp. 16–17)). Whereas
the tendency of entropy to increase and not decrease towards the future can be
understood as an asymmetry of physical processes with respect to time (or ‘in’
time), some take the stronger view that time itself has an asymmetrical structure
whereby the past-to-future direction has different properties to the future-to-past
direction. The discussion of this section concerns an independent issue: whether
time is directed from past to future. In this case, there is an analogous distinction
between ‘direction in’ and ‘direction of ’ time. For instance, one might take an
individual process to ‘happen’ from past to future, and so have a direction in time,
whilst not holding time itself to be directed. I take the discussion of the rest of
this section to be neutral with respect to this issue, and I will refer to the direction
of time and the directedness of processes in time interchangeably.
One interesting possibility worth briefly mentioning is for individual pro-
cesses be oppositely directed in time, meaning that there are time-directed pro-
cesses, but no master direction of time. Such a view could fit with the following
cases: (1) Feynman’s (1985) view of antiparticles as particles moving backwards in
time (see Arntzenius and Greaves, 2009 for a discussion); (2) time-symmetric ac-
counts of quantum mechanics containing both future-directed and past-directed
state vectors (e.g. Cramer (1986), Aharonov and Vaidman (2007), Vaidman (2010),
Kastner (2013)); (3) retrocausal accounts of quantum mechanics, such as Costa de
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Beauregard (1977) and Price (1994, 2012) in which causal processes can be both
future- and past-directed.
3.2 From time asymmetry to time direction
There are many takes on what it is for time to ‘have a direction’. Firstly there
are asymmetries in time. Most pieces of music are temporally asymmetric in that
were you to play them from right-to-left on the sheet music, you’d play a different
piece of music.³⁰ More significant to the philosophy of time are law-like asymme-
tries in time; kinds of processes that are systematically asymmetric with respect
to time, paradigm examples being the famous ‘arrows’ of time:
Cosmological arrow. The universe expands towards the future and contracts to-
wards the past.
Electromagnetic arrow. Electromagnetic waves expand from sources towards
the future and converge upon sources towards the past.
Thermodynamic arrow. The thermodynamic entropy of systems increases
towards the future and not towards the past.
There is also the more familiar set of arrows that underlies much of our everyday
understanding of how things work in the world that we can term ‘modal arrows’,
such as causes being earlier and not later than their effects, events counterfac-
tually depending upon earlier but not later events, and that we can act only for
future ends and not past ends.³¹
Strictly speaking, each of these ‘arrows’³² describes a class of phenomena that
behave differently relative to the two opposite directions of time (e.g. entropy ‘in-
creases’ relative to one temporal direction and ‘decreases’ relative to the other)
rather than explicitly ‘pointing’ in one way rather than the other. There is a
logical gap between something being asymmetric in time and being directed in
³⁰Indeed, it is noteworthy when a musical work incorporates time symmetries, such as the palin-
dromic instrumental sections of Sigur Rós’s Starálfur, and various sections of Haydn’s Symphony
no. 47.
³¹See Lewis (1979, pp. 458–462) for a useful discussion of such asymmetries.
³²As far as I know, the terminology of ‘arrow of time’ is coined by Eddington (1928, p. 35) in his
discussion of the apparent ‘one-way property of time which has no analogue in space’.
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time, and so it requires an inferential leap to take time-asymmetric phenomena
or laws to constitute arrows that really do point in only one temporal direction.
This point has been made in varying forms by several philosophers. As noted ear-
lier, Reichenbach (1956, ch. 15) stresses on several occasions that it is not a fact
that entropy ‘really’ increases rather than decreases, but rather our preference to
describe the thermodynamic arrow in future-pointing terms has the status of a
convention. In similar fashion, Price (2002, p. 88) notes that while ‘some people
may feel that they can make sense of the possibility that […] there is an objective
fact in nature about the slope of this entropy gradient — whether it is positive or
negative’, such a view requires ‘a further fact to be explained, in addition to the
existence of the gradient itself’, remarking that ‘I do not understand what that
additional fact could be, or what could count as evidence for it, one way or the
other’. Elsewhere, Price (2011, sec. 3; especially sec. 3.3–3.5 and 3.9.2) is scepti-
cal that any time asymmetry can provide sufficient grounds for singling out one
direction as the ‘real’ direction of time as opposed to the other.³³
3.3 The semantic arrow of time
What is uncontroversial is that we invariably describe and model such time asym-
metries as though they are directed in time, whether it be through talking as
though the universe is ‘expanding’ rather than ‘contracting’, or through putting
one-way arrows on the time axes of spacetime diagrams used to model the tra-
jectories of objects, or by assigning a particle a particular vectorial quantity as
opposed to its converse (e.g. as moving ‘up’ rather than ‘down’).³⁴ Indeed, we
typically do the same even for processes that are symmetrical in time, such as
the swinging of an idealised pendulum from left-to-right. Time-directed ways of
describing and modelling the world are ubiquitous within ordinary and scientific
³³Broad (1938, pp. 521–2) makes much the same point in response to McTaggart’s claim that the
past-to-future direction is the ‘fundamental sense’ of time on grounds of circularity. McTaggart
takes the movement of the present from earlier to later times to privilege the past-to-future direc-
tion, but Broad notes that this simply ‘presuppose[s] that the direction in time from earlier to later
is more important than the direction from later to earlier’; if we prefer the later-to-earlier direction,
we could alternatively say that time ‘passes’ in the opposite direction.
³⁴See Albert (2000, ch. 1) for a discussion of whether instantaneous states of systems should be
assigned vectorial quantities such as velocities.
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discourse. Call this time-directedness of our descriptions and scientific models of
the world the ‘semantic arrow’ of time.
Semantic arrow. We typically describe and model things in the world as though
they are directed in time.
C-theories and directional theories of time differ over the motivation and jus-
tification for the semantic arrow. Should we prefer to describe things in time-
directed ways because time is directed, and should we prefer past-to-future de-
scriptions over future-to-past descriptions because time is directed from past to
future? Or is the preference for a time-directed talk, and for past-to-future de-
scriptions, a kind of semantic convention? Or should we just do away with time-
directed ways of talking and modeling altogether? This gives three broad options:
realism; conventionalism; and eliminativism.
Realism about time direction. Time-directed descriptions andmodels aim to suc-
cessfully refer to, or represent, the real time-directedness of processes in the
world.
Conventionalism about time direction. Future-directed descriptions are to be
preferred to past-directed and temporally-adirectional descriptions on
conventional grounds, despite being no more true than them.
Eliminativism about time direction. All time-directed descriptions (both future-
directed and past-directed) are false, since they represent a non-existent
entity (the direction of time), and should be replaced with temporally-
adirectional descriptions.
I’ll first outline time-direction realism before detailing the two antirealist options
available to the C-theorist (conventionalism and eliminativism).
3.4 Realism about time direction
Time-direction realism is common to A- and B-theories of time. In the case of
A-theories, the past-to-future direction is taken to be the direction in which time
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passes.³⁵ In the case of B-theories: Mellor (1991, 1998, 2009) takes there to be a
fundamental directionality from causes to effects that privileges the past-to-future
direction; Earman (1974) and others³⁶ take the direction of time to be best under-
stood and represented in terms of a geometrical object — a temporal orientation
— that points at each spacetime point towards the local future; and Maudlin (2002,
2007) holds it to be an ‘irreducible fact’ that states of the world are ‘produced by’
earlier states.
For the time-direction realist, the future-directed statement ‘the universe is
expanding’ is true in terms of: (a) time is directed from earlier to later; and (b) the
universe is larger at later times than at earlier times (as is implied by cosmologi-
cal redshift). Such accounts use the idea of a primitive or irreducible direction of
time (or directedness of processes in time) to act as a truthmaker for time-directed
statements, or as an object that time-directed models aim to accurately represent.
By this standard, the past-directed statement ‘the universe is contracting’, though
an accurate description of how things look towards the past, is false since it mis-
represents the real direction of time. We can state this in the form of an argument
for time-direction realism:
(P1) We standardly talk andmodel things in theworld as though they are directed
from past to future (call this ‘time-directed talk’).
(P2) Our time-directed talk is (in general³⁷) true.
(P3) Time-directed talk represents time as being directed from past to future.
Or,
(P3*) The truth of time-directed talk requires time to be directed from past to
future.
³⁵This is the view of McTaggart (1927, p. 347), who holds that the earlier-to-later direction is
the ‘fundamental sense’ of time, owing to it ‘agree[ing] with the direction of the change’ (even
though McTaggart ultimately rejects the A series as unreal). See Zimmerman (2005) for a classic
contemporary take on the A-theory.
³⁶e.g. Weingard (1977), Clifton and Hogarth (1995), Malament (2004), Maudlin (2002, 2007), North
(2008).
³⁷Of course, even the realist concedes that we can say false things using time-directed language,
such as ‘that car is driving backwards down the road’ [it isn’t].
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(C) Time is directed from past to future.
There are two keyways in which the C-theorist can reject this argument: elim-
inativism rejects (P2) of the argument, holding time-directed talk to be systemat-
ically in error; and conventionalism rejects both of (P3) and (P3*) by taking time-
directed talk to be a useful convention that does not commit us to the existence
of a direction of time. I’ll go through each in turn.
3.5 Eliminativism about time direction
An obvious option for the C-theorist is to regard time-directed statements such
‘the universe is expanding’ as false. It is easy to read antirealism about time di-
rection in an eliminativist way: if there is no real directedness of things in time,
then one might think we should simply not talk as though things are directed in
time. Analogous kinds of eliminative antirealism have held popularity amongst
philosophers, such as moral error theory’s claim that all statements about moral
values are outright false since there are no moral facts to make them true. Follow-
ing moral error theory, time-direction eliminativism shares with time-direction
realism the claim that time-directed statements require the existence of a prim-
itive or irreducible direction of time in order to be true, and in the absence of
such a thing, time-directed talk is false. Whereas realists take past-directed talk
to falsely represent the direction of time, eliminativists take all time-directed talk
(both future-directed and past-directed) to refer to something that does not exist,
and so be in error.
Nonetheless, eliminativism about time direction has scarcely been defended
by philosophers. One personwho does appear to defend an eliminativist C-theory
is Gold (1966); he suggests that since positive and negative time are equivalent, we
should give up time-directed notions such as things being ‘related by cause and
effect’, which ‘now becomes meaningless’ (p. 327). Gold suggests that thinking of
the world only as it appears from past-to-future, as opposed to a fully temporally
adirectional conception, is parochial and inconsistent with the time symmetry of
physics, lamenting that ‘[i]t may be very difficult for us to change our ways of
thought’ (p. 329). In similar fashion, Price (1996, p. 266) calls for philosophers
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to provide a ‘proper conceptual framework for an atemporal³⁸ physics,’ imply-
ing throughout the book that conventional time-directed ways of representing
physical systems can be a hinderance to understanding time-asymmetries. Re-
ichenbach (1956) also has an element of eliminativism in that he cautions that one
should not hold that processes are ‘really’ directed in time (such as entropy really
increasing as opposed to decreasing). However, both Reichenbach and Price also
adopt conventionalist strategies.
3.6 Conventionalism about time direction
Rather than taking the non-existence of a direction of time to entail that time-
directed statements are false, the C-theorist may prefer to treat future-directed
talk as a useful convention. I use ‘conventionalism about time direction’ to refer
to a range of positions that offer a best-of-both-worlds option: avoiding realism’s
ontological commitment to a direction of time, while retaining the convenience of
time-directed talk.³⁹ This convenience functions at two levels: (1) preferring time-
directed descriptions and models to temporally adirectional ones; (2) preferring
future-directed descriptions to past-directed descriptions. The most notable con-
ventionalist account time direction is Reichenbach’s: though taking a language of
increasing entropy and a language of decreasing entropy to be ‘equivalent’ and
‘as true as [each] other’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 154), he suggests that the former
should be preferred on grounds of naturalness and convenience.⁴⁰
It is important to emphasise that the choice of a particular convention is not
arbitrary; Reichenbach notes that one should not overlook the ‘empirical content
³⁸Price’s use of ‘atemporal’ refers to a temporally adirectional position, namely the view from
‘nowhen’ (i.e. outside time), rather than a call for a physics that makes no reference to temporal
terms at all.
³⁹The use of the term ‘conventionalism’ to refer to such positions comes from how Reichenbach
relates the position to other kinds of conventionalism, such as Henri Poincaré’s geometric conven-
tionalism (see Reichenbach, 1956, ch. 18).
⁴⁰Conventionalism is distinct from reductionist accounts of the direction of time that aim to
provide conditions under which time-directed sentences can be true that are not irreducibly time-
directed, such as the Boltzmann–Reichenbach analysis of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ in terms of the entropy
gradient (and the related Albert–Kutach–Loewer analysiss of the asymmetry of counterfactual de-
pendence in terms of the past hypothesis). Though such accounts provide a semantics for time-
directed sentences, it doesn’t follow that they provide an independent justification for taking the
direction of entropy-increase, rather than entropy-decrease, to be the direction of positive time.
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associated with the use of [the] convention’ of taking positive time to be the ‘di-
rection of growing entropy’ (Reichenbach, 1956, p. 154). The empirical content
Reichenbach has in mind is that the causal structure of systems (as understood in
terms of his principle of common cause)⁴¹ is such that causes are to be found at
lower-entropy states than their effects, and so a language of increasing entropy is
a ‘more natural language’ (p. 154) than one of decreasing entropy, since it allows
us to give causal rather than teleological (or ‘final’) explanations (i.e. explanations
in terms of the causal past rather than causal future).⁴²
A further reason for preferring past-to-future descriptions considered by Re-
ichenbach is that future-to-past descriptions would be comparatively ‘inconve-
nient, because [they] contradict the time direction of psychological experience’
(Reichenbach, 1956, p. 154).⁴³ A closely related reason is that the past-to-future
direction reflects our temporal perspective as agents; as Price (1996, p. 155) puts it,
we ‘deliberate for the future on the basis of information about the past’. Price (1996,
p. 193 & p. 276, n. 14) refers to his own position as ‘conventionalism’ (though
more generally terms it ‘perspectivalism’ (Price, 1992, 1996, 2007)). Price’s posi-
tion amounts to a conventional preference for the past-to-future direction in the
wider context of his C-theoretic view that neither past-to-future nor future-to-
past languages are ‘objectively correct’ (Price, 2002, p. 88), prioritising the past-to-
future talk on grounds of practical relevance. Farr (2018, sec. 3) appeals to conven-
tionalism about time direction, and agency and interventionist accounts of causal
direction,⁴⁴ to argue that in cases in which there are independent grounds for
distinguishing a causal direction for processes (as is typically the case for macro-
scopic systems) C-theorists ought to prefer the direction of time in which causes
temporally precede effects to describe systems, as opposed to the time-reverse
⁴¹See Hitchcock and Rédei (2020) for an exhaustive and excellent overview of the principle of
common cause.
⁴²Reichenbach further notes that ‘the convention of defining positive time through growing en-
tropy is inseparable from accepting causality as the general method of explanation’ (Reichenbach,
1956, p. 154).
⁴³Reichenbach’s The Direction of Time was intended to include a final chapter discussing the
relationship between the physics and psychology of time direction, but Reichenbach died in the
process of writing this. See Maria Reichenbach’s introduction to the book for a summary of Hans’
notes on this.
⁴⁴See Woodward (2009), Price (2014) and Ismael (2016) for an ongoing discussion of whether
interventionist accounts of causation are distinct from agency theories.
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description and temporally adirectional descriptions.
4 Outlook
There is a range of different motivations and interpretations for a C-theory of
time. What C-theories have in common is the idea that there is a basic sense
in which the world is adirectional in time, whether that being motivated by the
time reversal symmetry of microphysics, the temporal bidirectionality of laws of
nature, or the statistical, local or emergent nature of the kinds of time asymmetries
that ordinarily motivate a belief in the directionality of time. In taking time to be
adirectional, C-theorists can regard time-directed descriptions of phenomena as
either: something to be eliminated from philosophical and scientific discourse; or
a useful and empirically-motivated convention that does not commit them to a
basic directionality of time.
There are much wider philosophical topics on which the distinction between
C-theories and directional theories bears, such as: the relationship between the di-
rection of time and direction of causation; the differences between initial and final
conditions; whether governing conceptions of laws of nature can be C-theoretic;
whether the time asymmetries of human psychology and memory support the
B-theory over the C-theory; and the openness of the future and fixity of the past.
All are issues to which the groundwork laid out in this article may be applied.
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